July 23, 2010

When Is It Reasonable to Be Angry With, or to Dislike, Someone?

Yesterday, out of the blue, Grobstein asked me whether I'd consider it reasonable to be angry with, or to dislike, someone just because he's causing me pain, however justified. Specifically, Grob asked whether I'd necessarily feel anger or hatred towards my torturer if I were being tortured, pursuant to a legitimate warrant, because I was suspected of knowing the location of a ticking time bomb.

I responded that I wouldn't, essentially because I consider it reasonable to dislike people based on their characteristics, not on their actions alone. For example, if someone got into a car accident with me, and it wasn't my fault, I wouldn't necessarily be angry with her; I would reserve judgment pending information regarding her state of mind -- was she, say, reckless, or was she doing her best but handicapped by inexperience? Similarly, for all I know my torturer is a cool guy who's just doing his job.

Upon further reflection, I think there's a noteworthy distinction between the reasonable grounds for disliking someone and the reasonable grounds for being angry with someone. When I'm legitimately angry with someone, I think it's necessarily because I believe she acted badly. I can't think of a situation in which I'd be legitimately angry with someone (as opposed to upset at my circumstances) but not think she should have behaved differently -- in a way that wouldn't have reasonably roused my wrath. Thus, I believe that being legitimately angry with someone implies that I consider her blameworthy.

On the other hand, I think the reasonable grounds for disliking someone are much broader, albeit circumscribed by proscriptions against prejudice, bigotry, and the like. Blameworthiness entails culpability, whereas one can reasonably be considered unlikable for all sorts of non-blameworthy reasons, such as having a bad sense of humor or being prejudiced against nerdy forms of entertainment. In other words, it's okay to dislike someone for having "bad" tastes, even if the existence of these tastes isn't his fault or, indeed, isn't a fault at all. However, we shouldn't be too quick to judge. We owe it to ourselves and others not to -- or at least to try not to -- feel distaste towards someone unless we have some idea of the content of her character.

I'm not sure how to defend my position in the abstract other than by noting that I regard attitudes such as anger and dislike as inescapably directed at dispositions, not actions. Although I typically say I feel angry at someone because of something he did, I think my anger stems from my view of the other person's motivations. Hurting me is not sufficient grounds for me to be angry with you; after all, you may have a good excuse, or even a justification. I may nevertheless be upset, but I wouldn't be upset with you -- at least, I don't think it would be reasonable for me to be, because you haven't exhibited an upsetting disposition. Analogously, I may be angry at losing a competition, but I shouldn't be angry with the winner if she was a good sport.

Ultimately, my position comes down to my view of anger and dislike as necessarily entailing judgments of character. When I say I'm angry with someone, I basically mean I think he's being an asshole. When I say I dislike someone, I basically mean that I find her unpleasant to deal with on the whole.

I'll add that I feel that reserving anger and dislike in these ways is a worthwhile form of self-mastery and facilitates good judgment. Consider the fundamental attribution error, which counsels against, for example, assuming that someone else who runs a red light must be a jerk (a dispositional explanation), while claiming that it was an emergency when we engaged in the same behavior (a situational explanation). We ought to scrutinize the bases of our anger and dislike lest we fall into such psychological traps -- lest we become jerks ourselves.

Grob disagrees with me -- he'd be angry with his torturer. Here's his view, as expressed to me in correspondence:

"It blows my mind that (you claim) you do not hate the torturer. You are not friends with your friends because they are the kind of people who are your friends. You are friends with them because of history and contingent circumstance. Given a different history and (especially) more social mastery, you would be friends with different people – indeed, different kinds of people. You give your kindness and loyalty to your friends (so I hope) even though they are not at bottom the most deserving. How could they be, given the happenstance that has led to your connections? Similarly, I hate the person who is my enemy, who is hurting or trying to destroy me, even if they have a good excuse, and even if in a counterfactual world we could have been friends. It’s bizarre to me that you (claim to) weigh the procedural safeguards before you decide how you feel about your tormentor – well, if there are torture warrants, and Posner signed off on mine, then shit. Perhaps those things are relevant. I do not think they are determinative. It seems crazy that you (claim to) believe that how someone is treating you is actually irrelevant to your relationship with that person.

"There may be some ideal sense in which hate is never an appropriate emotion, and we should all strive to be more Christ-like. Or perhaps we should learn to somehow accept but not condone hate in ourselves, so we do not dwell on it, or whatever. I try not to dwell on it. But I have not been searching for or describing ideal attitudes – just personal ones that I think are “reasonable.” It makes sense to point out here the scarier implications of Christ-like social ethics. According to Luke, J.C. says, “If anyone comes to Me and does not hate his father and mother, wife and children, brothers and sisters, yes, and his own life also, he cannot be My disciple.” In other words, these are ultimately contingent attachments or granfalloons – you just happen to be your parents’ children; why should you have any special feeling towards them? But attachments are probably psychologically impossible without loyalty, and loyalty means ignoring the merits and privileging contingent history. To be this way – as I think we must – means accepting to some extent that our feelings must be ruled by immediate circumstance, however arbitrary. To overcome this is a “self-mastery” that destroys something valuable."

What do you think?

13 comments:

Zed said...

cf. Orwell on Gandhi: "The essence of being human is that one does not seek perfection, that one is sometimes willing to commit sins for the sake of loyalty, that one does not push asceticism to the point where it makes friendly intercourse impossible, and that one is prepared in the end to be defeated and broken up by life, which is the inevitable price of fastening one's love upon other human individuals. No doubt alcohol, tobacco, and so forth, are things that a saint must avoid, but sainthood is also a thing that human beings must avoid."

I don't quite buy it; it proves too much. Parfit offers some persuasive examples in Part 2 of R/P in support of the claim that "commonsense morality" is sometimes a bad thing. In other words, at least some of the things you can defend a la Orwell/Grob are in fact granfalloons (overrated book btw). Where should one draw the line? I don't really know. I do think it's unambiguously a good thing to be "disloyal" in your _judgments_ though and not to overrate the charm, intelligence, looks, talents, etc. of people you know because you know them.

Grobstein said...

Hey so Alan I'm not clear what you think of an implicit question from the message of mine you posted: whether you think liking and being friends with someone similarly "necessarily entail[] judgments of character," so that it's similarly wrong to make decisions about liking and friendships based on the kind of contingent circumstance represented by being the torturer.

Do you regard this as a separate question , or are you committed to liking people only on the substantive merits?

Alan said...

Grob, I think I answer your question (perhaps among other places) in the second paragraph of my post. I think it's unreasonable to make likability decisions solely based on non-dispositional factors such as race or the fact that someone's job requires him to torture you. It's not that I must like the torture, but that I shouldn't dislike him just because he's torturing me.

Grobstein said...

Not sure I understand. Is this an asymmetry between liking and disliking?

If not, return to a scenario from one of your emails: "he may . . . possess all of the characteristics of your ideal friend." Suppose he does. Is it then only "reasonable" to like him?

Under this scenario, you think it is unreasonable to dislike the torturer, because that would be making a "likability decision" "solely" on the basis of the contingent fact that he is torturing you -- his character gives no possible grounds for complaint. For the same reason, you should hold that it is unreasonable not to affirmatively like (or love!) the torturer, since he's such a great guy who just happens to be torturing you. So I think you are committed to liking the torturer.

This is why it makes sense for my argument to articulate a different model of how liking and disliking work and "should" work.

Alan said...

Not sure I understand you either. In my discussion, I'm assuming I have no knowledge of the torturer's disposition (other than what I can surmise based on his choice of occupation and behavior during my interrogation), so I have no good reason to like or dislike him. I mean, if I considered torture categorically immoral, it would probably be reasonable for me to dislike him. I don't, and I'm assuming he's a potentially good guy legitimately doing his job for a decent government.

If he does in fact possess all the characteristics of my ideal friend(!), then yeah, I think it would only be reasonable for me to like him. This doesn't seem crazy at all.

Grobstein said...

Yes. So one way to state your position is that predicates like "Is not torturing me" are not properly included in the class of characteristics of one's ideal friend.

Grobstein said...

Analysis of these positions over in my comments.

Alan said...

For what it's worth, Will, who was initially skeptical, found the following argument in support of my position persuasive: suppose the government is randomly giving some people money, and you happen to be one of the lucky ones. Every two weeks, a government worker shows up at your door and hands you a check. Would you like this guy just because he happens to be a conduit through which utility flows to you? What if you find out that he's a repugnant person overall, and you just hadn't had a chance to notice due to the ministerial nature of your interactions? Would you then dislike him? If so, "symmetry" between liking and disliking demands that you like the torturer if he possesses personal characteristics that you'd consider overall worthwhile.

Grobstein said...

Suppose we tweak your hypo, and instead of doing something discrete and cold like delivering your check, the government worker has sex with you.

Grobstein said...

You presumably believe that doesn't matter, and that it's a psychological weakness to allow the "form" of the utility delivery to influence your feelings.

Similarly, you probably also believe that the torturer scenario is or ought to be equivalent to one in which a government worker brings you an envelope containing a fine you must pay.

I do not accept this view. I think part of the psychological "package" that gets you the possibility of close relationships and so on distinguishes based on considerations you apparently think are irrelevant, especially how intimate and how intense the experiences you share with a person are.

Alan said...

Suppose the torturer possesses the characteristics of your ideal friend, suppose it turns out that you were wrongly suspected of knowing the location of the bomb, and suppose the torturer offers to buy you a drink after you've recovered. Would you try to bury your past and befriend him? Would you demand an apology? What if he didn't give you one, on the grounds that your plight was procedurally legitimate and the torture policy is worthwhile? Would your decisions depend on how good a friend he could potentially be?

Grobstein said...

My position is not that character is irrelevant.

(PS why does it matter if he offers to buy me a drink afterwards? Does that speak to essential character somehow?)

Danny Kramer said...

What I'm missing is why we should assume that liking a person should have any connection to being reasonable. Supervillains can be likable, and do-gooders can be annoying--I don't see this as a big problem.

It becomes a problem when we systematically discriminate in our likability decisions, consciously or not, based on race, class, or other factor of a person's background. This entrenches an unhealthy and unfair superiority.

But in most situations the experience of hate is something to overcome, not to admonish. As with most everything else, it's how you act that matters. So I'd be angry with my torturer, but I'd mostly be looking for a way to escape, and maybe kill him on the way out to prevent him from hurting anyone else.

Maybe that's only because I don't know the location of the archetypal ticking time bomb. I swear!